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This article attempts to contribute to an understanding o f  the challenges involved in 
trying to bring the military under constitutional ride. It analyses Civil-Military 
relations during Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)ZLesotho Congress o f  Democracy 
(LCD) regimes in Lesotho in 1993-1998. In the aftermath o f  the 1994 constitutional 
crisis the civilian government aided largely by the SADC countries oj Botswana, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe on the one hand and British and United States o f  America 
on the other made aggressive effort to bring the military under its authority which 
until July 1998 appear largely successful. In August/September 1998, however, in the 
midst o f  a very serious political crisis, all these efforts were proved to have been 
futile.
Introduction
The history o f  military involvement in Lesotho politics dates back to 1970 
when Chief Jonathan, then Prime Minister o f  Lesotho and leader o f  the Basotho 
National Party (BNP), lost the general elections to the opposition Basutoland 
Congress Party (BCP). Instead o f  handing over power, Jonathan declared a state 
of emergency, arrested and detained leaders o f  the opposition and established 
a mono-party state. That action set in motion an authoritarian agenda 
characterised by brute force, naked oppression and de facto one-party rule that 
lasted sixteen years. U nderpinning and sustaining this agenda was the 
Paramilitary Police Unit (PM U) in the 1970s, and the Lesotho Paramilitary 
Force (LPF), and the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) in the 1980s. In short, in 
the period 1970 to 1986 the military acted as guarantors o f  civilian power under 
conditions o f  civilian d ic ta to r sh ip  and politicians used the military to ensure 
their survival (politicization o f  the military). In 1986, this force staged a
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military coup d'etal and instituted military rule that lasted until 1993.
Following the military managed transition to democracy , the third post­
independence general elections were held in March 1993 and were massively 
won by the BCP. Military rule in Lesotho was ended but not the centrality of 
military and military-type solutions in politics (militarisation o f  politics). This 
is what Hutchful (1993) refers to as ‘regime-induced transition’ characterised 
by a situation in which while the military leaves political power, it also 
entrenches itself for personal and institutional interests.
Following undiplomatic, mostly inept and careless actions o f  the BCP 
governm ent, especially on the question o f  the reinstatement o f  King 
Moshoeshoe II, King Letsie III staged a coup in 1994 which was only reversed 
by strong Basotho opposition in particular and external intervention of 
Botswana, South Africa and Z im babw e in general. In the aftermath o f  this 
coup, the BCP government supported by foreign governm ents and institutions 
initiated a series o f  reforms whose objective was to establish civilian control of 
the military. These reforms form the basis o f  this paper.
Writing on the question o f  military issues in the transition to dem ocracy with 
emphasis on the sensitive issue o f  reform Hutchful (1998:602) advises:
the objectives of reform should be at least fourfold: first, the democratic 
subordination of the military; second, the economic sustainability of the 
military establishment; third, military efficiency; and finally, military 
institutional stability.
This paper attempts to contribute to an understanding o f  the challenges 
involved in trying to bring the military under constitutional rule in new 
democracies by analysing the case o f  the LDF between 1993 and 1998. In the 
aftermath o f  the 1994 constitutional crisis, the BCP and Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) governments aided largely by Botswana, South Africa. 
Zimbabwe, Britain and United States o f  America made aggressive efforts “to 
restore and sustain civil supremacy over the military” which, until 
July/Septem ber 1998, appeared largely successful. In August and September 
1998, however, in the midst o f  a very serious political crisis, all these efforts
were proved to have been futile. What had happened and what is the way 
forward for the LDF?
The historical context o f  the necessity o f  restoring and sustaining civil 
supremacy over the military in Lesotho is the role o f  the military in the 1994 
palace coup and to this we turn.
The 1994 Palace Coup
On the 17th August 1994, King Letsie 111 announced the dissolution o f  a 
democratically elected BCP government and parliament. The reasons for this 
coup have been critically analysed elsewhere and therefore need no repetition. 
(Mahao,1997; Makoa,1995; Mothibe,1998; T h ab an eJ  998) This move which 
had the support o f  the BNP, royalist forces and the military ,was vehemently 
opposed by internal democratic forces as well as the international community.
Various reasons have been advanced why the military supported the K in g ’s 
coup. First, the dominant suspicion was that it was to be d isbanded and 
replaced by Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) at worst or neutralised at best. 
Presidents Mugabe and Masire (1994:4) attest to this when they say
...there was thus deep distrust of the Government [BCP] by the army, 
especially in the presence of rumours that the government was seeking to 
replace it with forces deriving from the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA ).
This was fuelled by anti-army statements made by senior BCP figures including 
Prime Minister Mokhehle who was reported to have said that, am ong the five 
enemies o f  democracy in Lesotho, was the army. (MoAfrica, 10 Hlakubele, 
1994). The opposition parties, especially the BNP leader E. R. Sekhonyana, 
exploited government's incompetence in addressing real and imaginary 
grievances o f  the army by repeatedly alleging that the government wanted to 
replace it with LLA. Secondly, and most importantly, was Prime Minister 
Mokhehle’s decision to set up a Commission o f  Inquiry into events relating to 
the L D F’s armed confrontation o f  January 1994. The Com m ission 's  terms o f  
reference included, among others, "to identify the persons or groups whose 
activities caused or contributed to those events," and recom m end, "the
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incorporation o f  former m embers o f  the Lesotho Liberation Army into the 
Lesotho Defence Force..." The commission was further mandated to 
recommend the future role o f  the army, redeployment o f  some o f  its members 
and possible legal proceedings against those involved in the January mayhem.
This move fuelled the military's suspicions that government had a secret 
agenda o f  bringing LLA through the backdoor. This was so because, although 
Prime Minister Mokhehle had claimed, on a number o f  occasions, that the LLA 
had been disbanded before his return from exile, some o f  the senior members 
o f  the BCP, including ministers, made persistent calls for its integration into the 
LDF.
Follow ing the reversal o f  the coup in the form o f  the M em orandum  of 
Understanding  (M O U ) signed between King Letsie 111 and Prime Minister 
M okheh le  and guaranteed by Botswana, South Africa and Z im babw e (the 
troika) which provided, among other things, the reinstatement/restoration o f  the 
BCP government, the latter embarked on measures to promote civilian control 
o f  the military.
Civilian Control and its Institutionalisation
Civilian control o f  the military is critical if democracy is to survive in Africa. 
Kohn (1997:143) defines civilian control as:
not a fact hut a process...The best way to understand |it|, to measure its 
existence and evaluate its effectiveness, is to weigh the relative influence 
of m ilitary officers and civ ilian officials in decisions of state concerning 
war, internal security, external defense, and military policy (that is, the 
shape, size, and operating procedures of the military establishment).
(emphasis in original)
In other words, in a democracy civilian control means "civil suprem acy  over 
the armed forces and subordination and accountability' o f  armed forces to 
the elected civil pow er."(N athan , 1995:50,58) The government, for its part, 
has a number o f  reciprocal duties if democratic civil-military relations are to be 
m ain ta ined  and sustained. First, the military should not be used for sectarian
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purposes by government. Second, both the government and the military should 
realise that the military's acceptance o f  the primacy o f  civilian rule does not 
mean that the military is the object o f  executive decrees. Third, government 
should act lawfully. Fourth, promotion within the military should be based 
solely on merit. Finally, government must provide adequate financial resources 
to enable the military to perform its tasks efficiently and effectively.(Ibid:60-1) 
The civilian control over the army goes with its full participation "in the 
development o f  defence policy w ithout underm ining or usurping the 
authority o f  civilian decision-makers."(Ibid:51) The institutional m echanism 
of a democratic civil-military relations lies in the creation o f  a civilian Ministry 
of Defence; "the locus o f  executive authority over the armed forces."(Ibid:55) 
(emphasis in original)
In August 1994, the Government o f  Lesotho established the Ministry o f  
Defence (MOD) and appointed an assistant minister responsible to the LDF and 
National Security Service (NSS). The 1997/98 annual report o f  M O D  puts its 
mission as:
...to reflect the notion of civilian control of the military and security service.
Civilian control is an essential aspect of democratic government. This is a 
condition which ensures that the military operates in accordance with the 
constitution and wishes of parliament.. .In order to establish civilian control the 
civil-military relationship is governed by four principles: separation of military 
and civilian powers, legality, accountability and transparency.(Annual Report 
1997/98:3)
In this ministry, policy is jo in tly  formulated and executed by the Principal 
Secretary (PS), the C om m ander o f  LDF and Director o f  NSS.
This arrangement, while entrenching civilian power over the military through 
the PS, provides a formal avenue for the military to advance their professional 
views and institutional interests. It also ensures regular and dynamic interaction 
and cooperation between the military general s taff  and the civilians.
I he establishment o f  the ministry was followed by sustained consultations/ 
inputs among and between the military, friends from within the region and 
further afield, and government (Defence News, 1996) These consultation
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resulted in the enactment o f  the Lesotho Defence Act o f  1996 whose objective 
is " to provide for the command, control and administration o f  the Defence 
Force o f  Lesotho and to provide for incidental matters." (Lesotho Defence 
Force Act, 1996:863) This act marked the legal entrenchment o f  civilian control 
o f  the military and the latter's acceptance o f  its role in a democracy. Critical in 
the act is the major revision and replacement o f  the Defence Commission by the 
Defence Council made up as follows: the Minister o f  Defence who shall be 
Chairm an; the PS Defence; Com m ander o f  LDF; Secretary appointed by the 
Minister, and two members appointed by Prime Minister (Ibid:870) It is 
important to note that each meeting o f  this council has to be chaired by either 
the chairman or the PS (both civilians) and the chairman has a casting vote.
The M O D  also embarked on an education programme for the military regarding 
the latter’s appropriate role in a democracy - respect for democracy, human 
rights and the primacy o f  civilian rule. Edmonds (1990:110-112) maintains that 
the education and training o f  officers and soldiers provides the foundation on 
which the normative aspects o f  professionalism are built. He argues that such 
education and training should focus specifically on the relationship between 
armed forces and society so as to discourage illegitimate forms o f  military 
involvement in public affairs. Since its establishment the following are just  a 
few exam ples o f  activities undertaken by the M OD in the fields o f  education 
and training o f  its officers:
(a) In March, 1995, the United States Embassy in Lesotho funded a 
workshop on the role o f  the military in a democracy which was 
addressed by Lieutenant Colonel Marley o f  the United States Army 
and Dr Laurie Nathan, Director o f  the Centre o f  Conflict Resolution, 
University o f  Cape Town am ong others.
(b) In July, 1995, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
in Lesotho funded a seminar on Democracy and the Disciplined Forces 
officially opened by the Prime Minister and addressed by experts from 
United States, South Africa, Z im babw e and Kenya.
(c) In September, 1996, the Ministry o f  Defence funded a seminar for
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members o f  the military at the Institute o f  Southern African Studies 
(ISAS) addressed by the National University o f  Lesotho (NUL) 
Academics.
UNDP has also funded studies at the d iplom a and post-graduate levels for the 
members o f  the military at the national tertiary institutions and abroad. 
(Mothibe, 1998:16)
Government's financial com m itm ent to the military has shown a steady and 
hefty increase since 1995/96 financial year when the budget allocation to 
defence was M l 02.63 - a huge difference o f  M 39.42 million from that o f  
1994/95. (Ministry o f  Finance) In 1996/97 it grew to M l 23.8 million ( 9.1 
percent of  the total budget and the third highest allocation). (Lesotho Budget 
Speech, 1996/97) In the 1997/98 financial year it was M l 47. I million and 
second only to Education. (Ibid) ...This has increased to M l 65.5 million in the 
financial year 1998/99. This reflects the increasing importance o f  defence in the 
national priorities o f  Lesotho as well as its strategic position for the survival o f  
the BCP/LCD government. It is also an indication o f  the willingness o f  the 
Government to provide sufficient funds to enable them to perform their tasks 
effectively and efficiently. The Minister o f  Finance said as much when 
presenting the 1998/9 budget, "...the Governm ent recognises the need to 
maintain a numerically small defence...which should be well trained, 
professional, accountable, highly motivated and well equipped." (Ibid:39) 
Furthermore, members o f  the military are also rumoured to be more than 
adequately remunerated.
At the public relations level, the M O D  has set up a public relations office M OD 
manned by military personnel to provide a w indow  for the public into military 
matters. Prime Minister Mokhehle visited the army at least once each year since 
1995 to address them, and has been reportedly well-received. We have heard 
less and less of  anti-army venom from the government ministers and members 
of parliament in particular and the B C P/L C D  in general. On the contrary, the 
Prime Minister and Minister o f  Defence, in a 1996 Christinas message stated 
that "...I, and my Governm ent are encouraged by these positive developm ents 
[climate o f  change in the defence and security forces] and the direction you
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have achieved so far in moving towards greater professionalism and 
discipline."(Defence News, 1996) Before leaving office o f  Prime Minister. 
Mokhehle visited the barracks to bid farewell to the military and announced that 
with immediate effect the rank o f  the commander o f  LDF was being raised from 
that o f  Major-General to that o f  Lieutenant General. The official reason was 
that that rank allowed the com m ander to attend regional meetings o f  chiefs of 
the military as an equal. (Radio Lesotho Broadcast, 13th April, 1998)
The King, on the advice o f  government, conferred highest honours on Basotho 
and foreign experts who were charged with the task o f  establishing civil- 
military relations in April 1998. These people ranged from Political Advisor to 
the Prime Minister to the Am bassador o f  the United States o f  America. (The 
Southern Star, 17 April 1998).
The role o f  SADC and Britain and United States o f  America has been as critical 
in the area o f  technical assistance. Each country either contributed military 
personnel to help in building civi-military relations consistent with democracy, 
regional workshops, educational progrmmes and practical support. For its part, 
Britain provided civil personnel in the forging o f  civil-military relations. In 
1994, the British government seconded a certain Mr. Phil Jones "to provide 
advice to the Government and senior s taff (i.e. PS Defence, C om m ander  LDF 
and Director N SS) on the issues relating to the organisation and management 
o f  defence - in particular the setting up and operation o f  the Ministry of 
Defence."(Defence News, 1995).
W hai em erges from our discussion so far is that since 1995, the BCP/LCD 
civilian governments have, to a large extent, aggressively attempted to steer the 
military towards acceptance o f  the implications and advantages o f  constitutional 
rule (read subordination o f  the military to civilian authority) with success. 
Prime Minister Mokhehle who was also minister o f  Defence said as much when 
he noted that "the restructuring o f  the Lesotho Defence Force and National 
Security Service is a milestone, and I want to put on record that it has been a 
successful endeavour." (Annual Report 1997/98:1) Lt. General Mosakeng, 
com m ander  o f  LDF is more direct, "I wish to put on record my sincere 
appreciation for the valuable contribution our defence made in promoting
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democratic principles." (Ibid: 15) This can be attributed to two factors namely, 
the role played by the United States o f  America, Britain, Botswana, South 
Africa and Z im babw e in the restructuring and training o f  the military and the 
establishment o f  the Ministry o f  Defence. The fruits o f  these governments' 
actions can be seen by the following examples. In February 1997, an armed 
section o f  the Royal Lesotho M ounted Police (RLM P) dismissed the 
Commissioner o f  Police, his deputy and many senior police officers; forcibly 
seized and occupied the Maseru Central Police Station and Police 
Headquarters. The military which was ordered to quash this police mutiny 
stormed the Maseru Central Police Station and Police Headquarters, arrested 
all the mutineers except two who escaped. Two policemen were killed in the 
process and the mutiny was ended. In June o f  the same year, Prime Minister 
Mokhehle, then leader o f  BCP, announced in the National Assembly the 
formation o f  his new political party, LCD which immediately became a ruling 
party and formed government because it com m anded a majority o f  seats in the 
National Assembly. The BCP, the winner o f  the 1993 general elections, which 
was then relegated to official opposition, felt betrayed and vigorouly opposed 
the LCD with the suport o f  BNP, M FP and other smaller parties. Twice, 
inarches by opposition parties were organised to the palace requesting that the 
king dismiss Mokhehle, dissolve parliament and call fresh elections. All these 
came to nought. The military, for its part, gave tacit support to the constitution 
(read LCD government).
Political crisis o f  4 A ugust to 22 Septem ber
All these successes have, however, been seriously reversed by the political 
crisis which arose following the general elections o f  the 23rd May 1998 which 
were unexpectedly massively won by LCD with 79 seats and 1 seat for BNP. 
The three opposition parties o f  BCP, BNP and M FP have refused to recognise 
the LCD government because they allege it won elections fraudulently. After 
their unsuccessful legal challenges at the High and Appeal Courts of Lesotho 
these opposition parties had, since the beginning of August, mobilised their 
supporters, occupied and kept vigil at the palace grounds requesting, am ong 
other things, that the king should dissolve the LCD government.
56 The Military and Democracy
W hat started as relatively peaceful protests turned violent when opposition 
supporters intensified their struggle on Monday 1 O'1' August, by imposing a 
stay-away that was characterised by violent blockades and commercial lock-out 
o f  M aseru, the result o f  which was that vehicles that ferry people to work as 
well as private vehicles were either turned away or damaged. Violent clashes 
ensued between opposition and government supporters and some people lost 
lives while others were injured and lost their properties either through arson or 
hijacking. Maseru remained largely inaccessible throughout the week of 
Friday/Monday, 11/17th August. Members o f  the army who patrolled the city 
remained largely indifferent to these acts o f  violence and intimidation which 
were perpetrated in their presence.
In the midst o f  the daily fast deteriorating situation, South African Deputy- 
President, Thabo Mbeki accompanied by Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo, and 
Defence Minister, Joe Modise on behalf  o f  SADC chairperson, President 
Mandela, arrived in the country to mediate. Out o f  the mediation an agreement 
was brokered that a Community SADC team o f  experts from Botswana, South 
Africa and Zim babwe be instituted to probe the opposition allegations o f  the 
rigging o f  May elections as well as "other matters relating to the electoral 
process," and report its findings within fourteen days. (Radio Lesotho broadcast 
15 August, 1998)
The SADC experts began probing alleged irregularities in the 23rd May general 
elections results on Saturday, 15th August. The team was chaired by Justice 
Pius Langa, deputy president o f  South Africa's Constitutional Court and made 
up o f  Auditors, elections, legal and computer experts from the troika countries. 
Unfortunately, the Langa Report took until the 17th Septem ber before it was 
delivered to relevant authorities and its findings were far from satisfactory. One 
com m enta tor  would note that ‘its findings were neither fish nor fow l’ as the 
following ambigious findings clearly shows:
We are unable to state that the invalidity o f  the elections has been conclusively 
established. We point out, however, that some o f  the apparent irregularities and 
discrepancies are sufficiently serious concerns. We cannot however postulate 
that the result does not reflect the will o f  the Lesotho electorate...(Langa
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Report, 1998:28)
The week beginning 17th August kicked o f f  with Maseru once again in a 
standstill after fatal shooting o f  protesters was reported at the Palace gates 
which resulted in two deaths and many injuries by the police. There was also 
a bloody clash between the police and members o f  the military guarding the 
Palace. The opposition, the police and the military blamed each other for the 
cause o f  these shootings. It is worth noting that on the same day at the same 
place in 1994, the members o f  the military killed Basotho protesting against the 
unconstitutional dissolution o f  the BCP government by King Letsie III. What 
was shocking to note in this state o f  anarchy was the role o f  the members o f  the 
military. During the unfolding o f  this political saga, members o f  the military 
were visible in and around Maseru presumably with the purpose o f  keeping law 
and order. As things turned violent as a result o f  forced stay-aways and clashes 
between the protesters and supporters o f  the government, mem bers o f  the 
military hardly ever intervened. W hat was even more shocking about this 
situation was that for the whole period when the city was inaccessible, the 
country was effectively without a government as the country's political and 
military leadership appeared totally helpless. Prime Minister Mosisili, also 
minister o f  defence, came over the national radio to assure the nation that the 
security forces would bring the situation to normalcy expeditiously. This did 
not happen; instead, the opposition tightened their seige o f  the city. The 
Commander o f  LDF, the Com m issioner o f  Police and some governm ent 
ministers respectively promised the same, but all these promises came to 
nought. Instead, the situation deteriorated after each promise culminating in 
mid-August and early September with the confiscation o f  government vehicles, 
closure o f  government offices, parliament, parastatal and private businesses, 
and the state run radio.
It was in the midst o f  this state o f  total anarchy that on the 10/1th September that 
Radio Lesotho announced the rather puzzling statement that:” We, the Lesotho 
Defence Force, are telling the nation and the world they [sic] should not be 
disturbed by what is happening. (The Star, 4 September, 1998) This statement, 
we now know, followed the arrest and detention o f  28 senior LDF officers, 
including its commander, L ieutenant-General M osakeng by ju n io r  officers.
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Mosakeng was to announce the dismissal o f  those detained officers as well as 
his own on the 11th September, 1998. (Radio Lesotho broadcast 1 1 September, 
1998).
These repetitive actions o f  the military reminiscent o f  those o f  1991 and 1993 
when jun io r  officers o f  the military successfully forced the resignation of 
Major-General Lekhanya, then Chairman o f  the Military Council and 
commander o f  RLDF and Brigadier Kopo, then deputy com m ander o f  RLDF, 
Colonels Moeko, Khemi and Lehloma respectively were coming at a time when 
it was clear that the LCD government enjoyed no support o f  the LDF, quite 
understandably, interpreted by the government as a coup plot. (Matlosa, 
1998:495) Deputy Prime Minister Maope had, on the 10"' September sounded 
an alarm over the national radio that “ we have something like a coup in the 
k ing d o m ” . This was significant com ing as it did from someone who had 
w orked under the military and had seen how they stage coups. In the event, 
Prime Minister Mosisili invited the SADC forces led by South African National 
Defence Force (SA N D F) and Botswana Defence Force (BDF) to support his 
governm ent because “ . . .T h e  mutiny in the LDF is taking root.. .[and] in this 
instance, we have a coup on our hands.’’(Mail & Guardian 16 September, 1998)
This SADCintervention forces, as we now know, brought untold suffering to 
Basotho in terms o f  precious lives lost, injuries sustained, total destruction of 
the business districts o f  Maseru, Mafeteng and M ohales’Hoek and the resultant 
loss o f  jobs ,  loss o f  national political and territorial integrity and enormous 
polarisation and hatred am ong Basotho.
The role o f  the military in this political crisis has triggered a lot o f  controversy. 
Tw o schools o f  thought have been advanced to explain the L D F’s role in the
crisis. The first school argues that " ............. the BNP in its 27 years o f  rule had
entrenched itself especially in the military such that successive governments 
had a legitimacy crises" (Molomo, 1999:5). In this crisis, therefore, LDF was 
on the side o f  the opposition parties. They point out that since the 4 August 
until the 22 September, when Maseru was under siege, and the LCD 
government was virtually paralysed, the LDF did nothing. They further point 
out that on the 3 September, for example, when the police attempted to disperse
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the opposition members camped at the Palace gates, automatic gunfire was 
exchanged w ith members o f  the LDF on duty at the Palace. One activist was 
killed while twelve others were injured (M ohlanka, 1 1 September 1998)
The second school argues that the indifference/reluctancy/hesitancy o f  the LDF 
was proof o f  a patriotic military which refused to be used "to butcher one o f  
their own" on behalf o f  a party which had fraudulently won the election and had 
formed an illegal government.(anonymous).
It seems obvious from the contention o f  the two schools o f  thought that the 
LDF has failed to justify  the rationale for its formation and existence namely, 
"the prevention and suppression o f  internal disorder and maintenance o f  law 
and order and prevention o f  crime" during the August and September 1998 
political crisis. We say so because o f  the following reasons. First, the Sixth 
National Development Plan (1996/1997 - 1998/99:243) in paragraph 17.64, 
section (ii) and (iii), spells out in very clear terms the objectives o f  the LDF as: 
"providing military assistance to the civil authorities in the maintenance o f  
internal security, when requested by government; and providing military 
assistance to the civil authorities in the maintenance o f  essential services" 
Second, under the provisions o f  Section 5, subsections (b) (ii) and (c) o f  
Lesotho Defence Force Act, (1996:869) "the Defence Force shall be 
employed... in the prevention or suppression o f  internal disorder and the 
maintenance o f  law and order and prevention o f  crime." Third, the constitution 
under Section 146(1) defines, in a very specific way, the function o f  the 
Defence as that o f  maintaining internal security and the defence o f  Lesotho. 
Fourth. Justice Maqutu (1995:2) is more forthright:
The m ain tenance  o f  law and order, pro tection  o f  lives and property  and to 
govern the country are the principle duties o f  G overnm ent. It is c lear therefore 
that the D efence Force. Police Force and the N ational Security  Services are the 
arm s o f  G overnm ent.
In summary, only two o f  the four organising principles proffered by Hutchful, 
namely, the economic sustainability o f  the military establishment and military 
efficiency appear to have largely been fulfilled. The enormous financial 
resources allocated to LDF over the past four years speak for themselves.
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LDF's efficiency has also been tested and found to be good, judg ing  by the 
quelling o f  the February 1997 police mutiny. What remains unfinished are the 
democratic subordination o f  the LDF as well as military institutional stability 
as the events o f  August and September once again showed.
Conclusion
Against the background o f  persistent interference/dabbling in politics by the 
LDF inspite o f  attempts by post-military governments to keep it out o f  politics 
and the absolute need o f  a non-partisan military if democracy is to take root and 
prosper in Lesotho, it is imperative that "professional and politically correct 
armies in the service o f  democratically-elected governments ought to be 
encouraged and supported .. . ."  (Chege, 1995:15). To this end, the Lesotho 
Defence Force Act o f  1996 which provides the legal framework for democratic 
civil military relations must be strictly adhered to. It draws a distinction 
between the respective powers o f  the military and civilian leadership; it offers 
normative guidelines for military professionalism; and it confers on Parliament 
a significant role regulating the military and defence policy.
However, the Lesotho Defence Force Act does not, and cannot, guarantee that 
civil-military relations will in fact be stable and consistent with democracy 
because civilian control is a process. The extent to which this goal is achieved, 
depends on the following factors in no order o f  priority:
The acceptance by LDF o f  the primacy o f  civilian authority and the 
rule o f  law.
Civilian authority must be accepted by all the country's political 
leadership and the general populace.
The forging o f  a common loyalty and discipline among all members of 
the LDF.
The LDF mission statement must be incalculated in the minds of  all 
members o f  LDF. (Annual Report 1997/98:16).
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Civilian authority must be supported by all organs o f  civil society.
Finally, on a more controversial note, the need for a defence force for a country 
totally surrounded by another country small, economically dependent and very 
poor needs to be revisited and widely debated.
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